In this commentary, I examine the litigation over the medical treatment of Charlie Gard from the High Court in April 2017 to the European Court of Human Rights and back to the High Court in July 2017. As is usual in cases of conflict between parents and clinicians over a child's medical treatment, referred to court for determination, at the heart of the dispute were sincerely and strongly held differences of opinion as to what was best for Charlie. The process of trying to convince Charlie's parents of the futility of their hope was prolonged by the legal process as the case proceeded through the appeal stages with the view of the treating clinicians agreed by the judge prevailing each time. In the July hearing, after the appeal process had been exhausted, Francis J made great efforts to resolve the dispute and mediate the conflict, while retaining judicial authority, but by this time the relationship between the parents and hospital was irretrievably broken. The protracted legal process was traumatic for Charlie's parents, stressful for Charlie's clinicians and nurses and required the judiciary to authorize his continued ventilation when it had been concluded that this was contrary to Charlie's best interests. I argue that this case demonstrates clearer than any before that a comprehensive review is required of the principles and processes applicable to disputes over children's medical treatment.
Court proceedings to determine a child's medical treatment
Questions about Charlie Gard's medical treatment were referred to court by Great Ormond Street Hospital Foundation Trust (GOSH) after his clinicians, who sincerely believed that the burdens of Charlie's daily existence outweighed its benefits, were unable to persuade his parents, Connie Yates and Chris Gard, that experimental therapy was not in Charlie's interests and that active treatment should be withdrawn. 1 The dispute between Charlie's parents and clinicians centred upon disagreement over both the progression of Charlie's condition and the chance of the experimental therapy improving the length and quality of his life. The effect of the court application was to remove decisions about Charlie's future from his parents and place the responsibility for those decisions with the judge. In April 2017, Francis J in the Family Division granted the order sought by the Trust against which Charlie's parents, determined to continue their fight for their son, appealed through the domestic courts and then applied to the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECHR). In July 2017, GOSH referred the case back to the Family Division seeking a view of the judge upon further medical opinions secured by the parents. After further tests, Charlie's parents accepted that Charlie's progressive condition had deteriorated to the point that the proposed treatment could not benefit him. By appealing through the courts, his parents were able to delay the outcome but not, as they wished, change it.
Disputes between parents and clinicians about the medical treatment that is in the best interests of a seriously ill child are distinctive among those brought before judges of the Family Division of the High Court. They are different in significant ways from private law family proceedings brought under the Children Act 1989 where parents are disagreed over their child's upbringing. 2 The disagreement is not between parents, one of whom has sought the assistance of the court. 3 And although Counsel for Charlie's parents sought to draw an analogy in terms of the limits placed by the law upon state intervention in family life in care proceedings, these are not public law proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989. Rather, the disagreement is between parents and professionals, both of whom have an interest in the child's well-being and legal duties to act in the best interests of the child. Legal proceedings are brought at the request of professionals upon whom parents' rely for the provision of medical treatment to sustain the child's life by a public institution, the NHS Trust. As Francis J observed commenting upon the lack of legal aid in such cases, 'To most like-minded people, a National Health Service Trust is as much an arm of the state as is a local authority'. 4 The sense that the parental decision is challenged by the state is furthered if, as it invariably does, the court appoints a Guardian to represent the independent interests of the child 5 ; a Guardian who may, as did Charlie's Guardian, reach the conclusion, contrary to that of the parents, that the continuation of life-sustaining treatment is no longer in the child's best interests. Further, the issue upon which there is disagreement arises from decisions which the majority of parents will never have to confront in their parenting, of giving lifesustaining medical treatment to or withholding, or withdrawing, life-sustaining treatment from a seriously ill child. These cases are concerned with questions of life or death for the child. Once referred to court, in contrast with other issues of a child's upbringing which may be brought to court for resolution upon which there is little expert evidence, determination of the child's best interests is inevitably focused upon the medical evidence. Evidence which clinicians are better placed than the child's parents to secure and to understand. The significant differences from other family proceedings raise questions as to whether distinct processes and principles are required for the conduct of such cases.
Writing back in the 1980s, when the body of medical law was very limited, Ian Kennedy argued that while areas of medical practice that raise social, political and moral questions should not be left to the individual practitioner 6 neither are they best regulated by case law. Developing the law through 'hastily convened hearings', he argued, amounted to an 'interstitial form of law-making'.
7 Yet, the law has been left to develop on a case by case basis over the past 40 years. This one case, raising numerous ethical and legal issues, highlights the need for a thorough review of children's healthcare law to develop legal principles and processes specific to the particular needs of children, parents and professionals in these cases. 8 14 To argue the case for a comprehensive review of children's healthcare law, this commentary examines the Charlie Gard case as it progressed through the courts.
The facts
Born in August 2016, Charlie appeared to be an entirely healthy baby. At the age of 8 weeks, Charlie started to have difficulty feeding and was admitted to hospital with aspiration pneumonia where he remained on a ventilator and fed by nasogastric tube for the rest of his short life. He was diagnosed with an extremely rare, inherited, progressive, condition, mitochondrial depletion syndrome, RRM2B. Mitochondrial conditions affect the generation of the energy supply of cells, 15 in Charlie's case affecting his ability to move, breathe, neurological functioning and hearing.
Following what was described by one of the GOSH consultants as a 'parent-driven exploration of all alternatives internationally', his parents wanted Charlie to try nucleoside bypass therapy. Although the therapy was experimental, it had never been administered to a child with the form of mitochondrial depletion syndrome which Charlie had, 16 and although there was no prospect of a cure, his parents thought it offered him a chance of improving the length and quality of his life. Charlie's parents were in contact with parents of children who had received nucleoside therapy for a similar mitochondrial condition, TK2, and whose quality of life had improved. Charlie's parents were thus determined that he should have this 'one shot, one chance of life'. His clinical team considered this request and prepared an application to the Rapid Response Clinical Ethics Committee to request approval to attempt the therapy. However, before they could do so, in January 2017, the frequency of Charlie's seizures increased which his clinicians believed caused him severe and irreversible brain damage. As a consequence, his clinicians concluded that the burdens of everyday living outweighed the benefits and that it was not in his interests to be maintained on a ventilator for the administration of treatment which was of uncertain benefit. Second opinions from 'world leading 10. Op. cit., at para. 9.11. 11. Op. cit., at para. 9.11-9.19. 12. Op. cit., at para. 9.10. 13. Op. cit., at para. 9.51-9.54. 14. Op authorities' supported their conclusion that withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was reasonable and in accordance with RCPCH guidelines. 17 Professor A, an expert in mitochondrial conditions at GOSH, was concerned that Charlie had a conscious experience of pain but was unable to express it. The intensive care he was receiving including ventilation and regular suctioning of his airways is known to cause pain and suffering. 18 His devoted parents, who spent hours with him every day, did not accept his doctors' assessment of the severity of his brain damage. They believed that he had periods of wakefulness, opened his eyes, knew who his parents were, responded positively to them and gained comfort from them. 19 Commencing the lengthy legal battle, GOSH applied to court for a declaration under its inherent jurisdiction and a Specific Issue Order under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 that it was not in Charlie's best interests to be given nucleoside therapy and that it was lawful to withdraw ventilation and provide palliative care. The issue before the court was novel to the extent that it addressed both the question whether it was lawful and in Charlie's best interests to receive experimental therapy and whether it was in his best interests for life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn. The court order sought by GOSH was unprecedented in that it not only addressed the legality of the care plan the GOSH clinicians wished to implement, despite the lack of parental agreement, but also the legality of the provision of therapy by a doctor in the United States who was, at that time, offering to administer it.
Decisions about a child's medical treatment are made by parents, in the exercise of their parental responsibility, 20 which requires them to make decisions as to the treatment, from the options available, they consider to be in the best interests of the child. 21 But the child is the patient to whom doctors have legal duties including to treat according to their professional judgement of the best interests of the child. As Hedley J explained in one of his judgments concerning the future medical treatment of Charlotte Wyatt, a child with a complicated medical condition as a result of prematurity, doctors will seek to accommodate parental wishes as far as 'professional judgment and conscience' allow.
22
Approaching decisions about the medical treatment that is in the best interests of a seriously ill child from different perspectives, with different knowledge and experiences, 23 duty conflicts with fulfilment of professional duty. Where alternative means to resolve the disagreement have been exhausted, the Trust is under a duty to refer the matter to court. 24 Although there is no clear guidance on the steps or measures the law requires clinicians or Trusts to take prior to referral to court. Once court proceedings have commenced, parents who were the decision makers by virtue of parental responsibility then depend upon the legal advice provided by solicitors, the barristers instructed to present their case, and upon the values and principles of the judge upon whom the law confers decision-making responsibility. As Francis J rhetorically posed in his April judgment, 'Some people may ask why the court has any function in this process, why can the parents not just make the decision for themselves?':
The answer is that, although the parents have parental responsibility, overriding control is by law vested in the court exercising its independent and objective judgment in the child's best interests. The Great Ormond Street Hospital has made an application and it is my duty to rule on it, given that the parents and the hospital cannot agree on the best way forward. 25 
High Court proceedings
At the pretrial hearing in March 2017, an independent Guardian was appointed to represent Charlie and Francis J gave his parents a month to obtain evidence about the proposed experimental therapy. 26, 27 During which time, his parents through crowdfunding raised in excess of £1.3 m to pay for Charlie's treatment in the United States. 28 Although, as Francis J stated in his judgment, it was not a question of funding but whether it was in Charlie's best interests for him to undergo a trial of the therapy and to remain on intensive care support while it was tried.
29 GOSH had previously administered nucleoside therapy to children with other mitochondrial conditions. 30 Had Charlie's clinicians, and then the judge, agreed that the trial of therapy was in his best interests, subject to ethical approval, it would have been provided.
Judges are regularly asked to determine the fate of children whose doctors have concluded, but whose parents do not agree, that further treatment offers limited benefits in terms of quality or quantity of life. In the months during which Charlie's care was before the courts, there were three cases decided and published on BAILII in which the High Court declared that it would be lawful to withhold life-sustaining treatment from a child. 31 Reported judgments suggest that there are examples of parents who, having listened to the evidence presented in the court proceedings, are better able to understand the clinicians' reasoning and reconcile themselves to the clinical view of what is best for their child.
32 Some parents may accept the ruling of the court as an authoritative determination with which they must comply, as a final decision meaning they have done all they can for their child. Not all cases take the form of disputes, for example, where a child is in local authority care, questions about ending active treatment must be referred to court for determination even if all with parental responsibility are agreed that this is best for the child. 33 Yet, there are plenty of examples from the reported cases of parents who have not been convinced that the independent, objective, decision of the judge or as Charlie's mother, Connie Yates, put it a stranger, 34 better reflects the interests of their child than their own assessment. For example, despite unsuccessfully challenging the refusal of Cambridge District Health Authority to fund an extra-contractual referral for further treatment for acute myeloid leukaemia, Jaymee Bowen received the treatment in the private sector, funded by an anonymous benefactor. 35 The parents of baby C applied for permission to appeal against the order of the court authorizing a blood test to determine C's HIV status. By the time, the Court of Appeal considered their application, 3 days before the test was due to be performed, the parents and child could not be located and were believed to have left the jurisdiction in order to avoid the test. 36 C's mother was quoted in the press expressing the view that parents should make decisions on behalf of their child and speak for them until the child is old enough to make her own decisions and objecting to state intervention into family life. 37 In such a situation, court proceedings become merely an adversarial, stressful, increasingly high-profile, stage in the ongoing disagreement between two sides, parents and professionals, who are genuinely concerned to do what is best for the child. Proceedings which cannot be said successfully 31 to resolve the issue. In cases where trust has broken down, in which the 'partnership' of care 38 has unravelled and parents and clinicians have strongly held opposing views about what is best for a child, the question must be whether decisions about a child's medical treatment are really best made by judges following the presentation of the evidence of the opposing sides. Although particularistic, focused upon judicial determination of the best interests of the specific child, court proceedings feel adversarial; parents fighting the professionals upon whom they depend, and where the court appointed Guardian agrees with the clinical assessment, the state, for their child's life.
The applicable legal principles by which a judge of the Family Division decides applications from Trusts to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a child were developed in the early decisions of the Court of Appeal in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the cases of Re C, 39 Re J (1990) 40 and Re J (1992), 41 the Official Solicitor (the former version of the Guardian in Charlie's case) sought guidance from the court, in the absence of legislative guidance, for those with responsibility for the child. The legal principles can now authoritatively be found in the 'intellectual milestones' noted by the Court of Appeal judgment in Wyatt, 42 set out as 10 propositions by Holman J in Re MB.
43 Where the matter is brought to court, the court must decide it and the duty of the judge is to determine the course of action that is in the best interests of the child. Best interests must be assessed in the widest possible sense, not just medical but also 'emotional, sensory (pleasure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the human instinct to survive) considerations', 44 arrived at through a balance sheet of benefits and burdens. Beyond best interests, the judge is directed to consider the child's quality of life, from the perspective of the child, and to recognize the strong, but not irrebuttable, presumption in favour of the prolongation of life. The judge makes an independent assessment of the child's best interests, yet legal proceedings appear to be a contest between the claims of adults to know what is best for the child in which the parental decision is challenged by the Trust whose doctors cannot be required to treat contrary to their professional judgement.
During the 3 day hearing in April 2017, Francis J heard evidence from Charlie's clinicians and nurses, experts from the United Kingdom, the US doctor who was prepared to trial the therapy and Charlie's parents. Focused upon their child, parents may become experts in their child's condition and its treatment; they will be the experts in their child's experience of their condition, its treatment, their pleasures and pain. Francis J, as is common in such cases, acknowledged that the parental evidence may be of particular value because parents have particular knowledge of their child but, at the same time, the court will be 'mindful' that their views may be 'coloured by their own emotion or sentiment'. 45 During the hearing, Charlie's parents had to listen to accounts of his lack of capacities with which they fundamentally disagreed and to assessments of his deterioration which they did not recognize. Charlie's parents believed that he was stable and that his condition had not deteriorated since the time when the clinicians had been prepared to trial the therapy. Parents in such cases may be able to get evidence of 'research and experimentation', of 'ideas and possibilities' or reports of 'success stories'. 46 However, it may be difficult for them to secure evidence of properly conducted research studies of the treatment they wish their child to have which Bodey J stated in the earlier case of SR would be required if a court is to be convinced that it was in the child's best interests to receive it. 47 The US doctor who was prepared to try the therapy gave evidence, via a video link, to the effect that there was a theoretical chance of a 'modest difference to life expectancy', and a 'low, but not zero' probability of the treatment being of benefit to Charlie's brain although it 'almost certainly' could not reverse structural brain damage. 48 In his evidence, he betrayed his lack of specific knowledge of the extent to which Charlie's condition had affected him. On the issue of the withdrawal of ventilation he said, 'perhaps if I were there, I would support it. Not seeing the child, not seeing the progression, it is difficult for me to make an assessment'. 49 In the July proceedings, Francis J explained that the court could not rely upon the evidence of a doctor who had not examined the child. 50 Perhaps, this was a 'remarkably simple proposition' but it was not one that was clear to Charlie's parents or lawyers in their presentation of the evidence for the first hearing. Had this been made clear to them during the April hearing, it may also have come to light at that point that neither had the US doctor examined Charlie's medical records, tests results or the second opinions. While there was an open invitation from GOSH to the US doctor, it was only at the invitation of the judge in July that the doctor, by then named as Professor Hirano, came to London to examine Charlie, his test results and his records. All the time that Professor Hirano was offering Charlie a trial of the therapy, Charlie's parents retained their hope that there was a chance of a longer, and better quality of, life for their son. 51 To ensure that the judge has the evidence necessary to undertake the thorough assessment of the best interests of the child that the law 45 requires, consideration needs to be given to assisting parents to secure what reliable evidence there is of the course of action they believe is best for their child.
The evidence available to Francis J in April from the UK doctors, shared by those from whom they had secured second opinions, was that 'the prospect of the nucleoside treatment having any further benefit is as close to zero as makes no difference. In other words, . . . it is futile', 52 meaning 'pointless and of no effective benefit'. 53 This medical evidence together with the view that Charlie, hospitalized, ventilated, tube-fed, did not have a 'quality of life . . . that should be sustained without hope of improvement' 54 led to the conclusion that neither the therapy nor continued ventilation was in Charlie's best interests. Counsel for Charlie's parents pointed to the novel issues raised for the law in that there were no previous 'cases where life sustaining treatment has been withdrawn, even from a profoundly disabled child with a desperately poor quality of life, where there is an available treatment which has the potential materially to improve that quality of life'. 55 On the basis of his findings of fact, Francis J responded to the effect that he considered it was 'putting it far too high to say that there is an available treatment with potential materially to improve Charlie's quality of life'. 56 Having reached conclusions on the evidence, Francis J made the declaration sought by the Trust that it was 'lawful, and in Charlie's best interests, not to undergo nucleoside therapy'. 57 Further that it was lawful to withdraw ventilation and provide palliative care, despite his parents' objections. 58 Holding on to the hope offered by Professor Hirano and firm in their view that Charlie's condition had not deteriorated as much as his doctors considered, the judgment of Francis J did not change his parents' minds.
Court of Appeal
Parents of seriously ill children will use all means available to secure the best possible treatments for their child.
59,60 For Charlie's parents, this meant continuing their fight 52. Op. cit., at para. 119. 53. Op. cit., at para. 90. 54. Op. cit., at para. 126. Francis J described this as a consensus view. However, agreement that the status quo should not be continued was premised upon very different views as to the implications of this conclusion. His clinicians considered that it followed that life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn, while for his parents, it meant that he should be given the therapy which they believed presented the chance of improving his quality of life. Chris Gard's evidence is noted in GOSH's position statement of the 13th July, at para. 5. To the contrary, the vast majority of parents will be able to agree with their through the courts in the hope that their opinion of Charlie's current condition and their belief that the therapy offered a chance of improving his quality of life, to which Charlie was entitled, would prevail. Yet, these were matters of fact, upon which Francis J had found on the evidence before the court, and were not appealable. First, permission to appeal has to be given by either the judge at the original Family Division hearing or by the Court of Appeal. Permission will only be given if there is a prospect of the appeal succeeding or if there is a compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. 61 An appeal can only be brought on the grounds that the decision of the lower court was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural, or other, irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court. 62 As a consequence, in comparison with the High Court hearing which focused upon the different view of the facts held by Charlie's parents and clinicians, the appeal courts were concerned with legal argument. Francis J refused, but the Court of Appeal granted, permission to appeal on the issue of whether a different approach should be adopted where there is a choice between two viable treatment options to that adopted when there is no alternative treatment and upon the question of the jurisdiction of the court where both holders of parental responsibility are agreed that an alternative treatment is in their child's best interests. 63 The Court of Appeal hearing took place 6 weeks after the High Court hearing, the complex argument crafted by a new legal team and represented by new Counsel, Richard Gordon QC, slotted into 1 day found in the Court's busy schedule. Notably, in legal terms, Charlie's parents appeal was opposed not only by the hospital but also the Guardian, as independent representative of Charlie's interests, who having visited Charlie in hospital, spoken to his parents, doctors and nurses, and listened to the oral evidence at the hearing, had reached the same conclusion as to Charlie's best interests as the judge. 64 This served further to distance the parties as Charlie's parents believed they were the ones most closely concerned with, and best placed to represent, Charlie's interests. While as both the Supreme Court and ECHR stressed, it is important that the child is independently represented, it is understandable that Charlie's parents felt that the Guardian was supporting the position of the Trust leaving them to defend their child's right to life. While the position adopted by the Guardian was reached following a careful review of the evidence, this does raise issues for consideration of the representation of the child separately from his or her parents and from his or her clinicians.
Given the simplicity and clarity of the law and the discretion it gives to a judge in assessing the best interests of the child, it was necessary for Counsel for Charlie's parents to try to distinguish Charlie's situation from all the others in which a court has been asked to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a child and, from there, to argue that the law as applied to Charlie's situation should be child's doctor upon a course of treatment that is best for their child, including when treatment options have been exhausted or active treatment should be withheld or withdrawn. 61. Civil Procedure Rules, 52.6(1). 62. Civil Procedure Rules, 52.21(3). 63. Supra note 59, at para. 36. 64. Supra note 16, at para. 116-122. different. The submission, which was rejected by the Court of Appeal, was that where there is a doctor who, in his or her professional opinion, is prepared to administer a viable alternative treatment, parental preference should only be overridden if it is likely to cause the child 'significant harm'. 65 McFarlane LJ stated that there was no 'factor or filter' before the court evaluates the best interests of the child. 66 Furthermore, that as the judge had found that administration of nucleoside therapy would be futile, be of no benefit and merely prolong Charlie's 'awful existence', there was no viable alternative before the court. 67 Finally, although it had not been addressed in the court below, McFarlane LJ concluded that had Francis J been invited to find whether Charlie was currently suffering significant harm he would have so concluded 68 and, it followed, significant harm would result from the continuation of ventilation and Charlie's life in order to administer nucleoside therapy. 69 Thus, the court found that the submissions could not be supported as a matter of fact rendering irrelevant the question of a distinction in law. Although it is notable that there was no analysis of significant harm in the context of the medical treatment of a child generally or specifically of a seriously, a terminally, ill child requiring mechanical ventilation to sustain life and whose parents wished him to receive experimental therapy.
The second ground of appeal was that the application by GOSH to prevent another providing the treatment was beyond the powers of the hospital as a public authority and in the absence of significant harm outside the court's jurisdiction. 70 The Court of Appeal preferred the submission of Ms Gollop QC for the hospital that the issue had arisen between the parents and the clinicians which the Trust had properly brought before the court for a judge to decide according to the best interests of the child. 71 Parental hopes were thus raised by the hearing of their appeal. But, as Charlie's parents found, appeal against the decision of the first instance judge is usually unsuccessful. Only in the case of Re T in 1997 was the parental appeal successful on a point of law and the decision of the court at first instance as to the best interests of the child overturned. 72 In all other cases concerned with the medical treatment of a young and dependent child, while the terms of the declarations made by the High Court judge may be amended, the effect of declarations made upon application of the Trust authorizing doctors to proceed, against parental wishes, has been upheld. 73 While the legal argument was necessarily constructed in the attempt to reverse the decision of the judge at first instance, Counsel for Charlie's parents made an important point about distinctions between cases of children's medical treatment, which the Court of Appeal, concerned not to disrupt 40 years of case law, was not prepared to entertain. Cases, it should be emphasized, which were each concerned with the assessment of the best interests of a seriously ill child and not more general, but crucially important, questions about the balance between parents, professionals and the state in the protection of the welfare, interests or rights of the child. To continue their fight for Charlie, his parents needed permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court refused
No case concerning the medical treatment of a young and dependent child has been considered by the Supreme Court or its predecessor the House of Lords. In the 1980s, the House of Lords decided Gillick, 74, 75 which concerned the hypothetical question of the legality of contraception and hence medical treatment to a child under the age of 16, and Re B 76 which concerned the non-therapeutic sterilization of a minor with learning difficulties. The Supreme Court in Yates denied the parents' permission to appeal. Lady Hale, giving the reasons for the Justices' conclusion after a short retirement following 2 h of argument, explained that the hospital was entitled to ask a judge to decide about Charlie's future medical treatment and the judge was entitled to do so. Further, that the judge had made findings of fact that could not be challenged on appeal and had applied the correct test to those facts to reach the conclusion he had. The findings of fact which the parents continued to dispute were not open to questioning and the case did not raise an arguable point of law of general importance. Thus, the Supreme Court declined to review the applicable legal principles, developed on a case by case basis by the lower courts and upheld the order made by Francis J some 8 weeks earlier. Charlie needed a final decision on his future treatment and the Supreme Court wished to give it yet were obliged to agree a further stay to the order given the parents' application to the ECHR.
Application to ECHR deemed inadmissible
Domestic case law on children's medical treatment has adopted the position that while ECHR rights are engaged, they confirm rather than 'alter or add to established principles of English domestic law' so that 'specific consideration' of the ECHR is not necessary. 77, 78 The view that English Law is compatible with Convention Rights in such cases was confirmed by the ECHR in Glass v. UK. 79 In Glass, the ECHR determined that doctors had breached David Glass's Article 8 right to private and family life when morphine was administered to him, against the refusal of consent from his mother. While the court concluded that English law complied with the Convention, failure to comply with that law had resulted in an interference with David's Article 8 right and, although his doctors had acted with a legitimate aim (in accordance with their clinical judgment of David's best interests), administration of diamorphine against his mother's wishes without seeking consent from the court was not necessary in a democratic society.
The complaint made by Charlie's parents to the ECHR was that GOSH, by preventing Charlie from receiving life-sustaining treatment, had violated their and Charlie's Article 2 right to life and that the consequence of the order of the court was to violate their and Charlie's Article 5 right by depriving him of his liberty. 80 Questions, which had not been raised in Glass, about the standing of parents to make a complaint on their child's behalf were left unresolved; the ECHR considered it sufficient to address the parents' complaints under Articles 2 and 5. Further, his parents argued that the decisions of the court taken according to the best interests of the child amounted to a disproportionate interference with their Article 8 right to respect for private and family life as the court failed to consider whether there was a likelihood of significant harm to Charlie. And that, contrary to their Article 6 right, the Court of Appeal had concluded, without hearing any evidence, that their decision would cause their child significant harm. 81 The ECHR found all arguments to be manifestly unfounded. Article 2 did not require access to experimental treatment to be regulated in any particular way and the United Kingdom had a regulatory framework in place which was derived from the relevant European Directives. 82 The United Kingdom also had a regulatory framework for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment compliant with Article 2, which took account of the wishes of the child as expressed through his Guardian and GOSH had properly applied to the court so any complaint under Article 2 in this respect was also manifestly unfounded. 83 The ECHR considered there to be a lack of specificity as to the complaint under Article 5 and held that, insofar as it concerned the lack of procedural safeguards, the complaint raised the same issues of the availability of a domestic legal framework and application to domestic courts as considered in relation to Article 2 and did not add anything. 84 Viewing the complaint under Article 6 as supplemental to the complaint under Article 8 the ECHR concluded that there had been an interference with private and family life but one that was in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the 'health or morals' and 'rights and freedoms' of Charlie. On the question whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, framed in terms of the argument that the appropriate test was one of risk of significant harm rather than best interests, the ECHR noted the broad consensus within domestic and international law placing the best interests of the child as paramount. While the facts of the case were exceptional and there was a lack of ECHR guidance on the point, the Court noted that the domestic courts had concluded there was a risk to Charlie of significant harm. 85 The legal framework had not been shown to be disproportionate, rather it was meticulous and thorough; ensured that all those concerned were represented throughout; heard extensive and high-quality expert evidence; accorded weight to all the arguments raised; and were reviewed at three levels of jurisdiction with clear and extensive reasoning giving relevant and sufficient support for their conclusions at all three levels. 86 Respecting the state's margin of appreciation, the existing principles and processes of English law were considered compatible with Convention Rights. That conclusion does not prevent English law from doing more to protect the rights of the child and of parents in dispute with professionals over the best interests of a seriously ill child. Whether English law could, or should, is not an issue to be settled in legal proceedings but requires independent and thorough review.
A review of children's healthcare law
The appeal process extended court proceedings over 5 months despite fast-tracked, timepressured, hearings. The order made by Francis J was stayed five times, once pending the Court of Appeal hearing, once pending the application to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal and three times prior to the decision of the ECHR. 87 While the appeal process was exhausted, the dispute between Charlie's parents and clinicians continued. Implementation of the order was delayed due to disagreements over Charlie's end of life care. In July 2017, 88 GOSH returned to the Family Division so that Francis J could evaluate what Charlie's parents considered to be new evidence from the US doctor and other experts in the field. The judge gave the parents 2 days to secure written evidence so that he could determine whether it amounted to compelling new evidence which would enable him to revise his view. Mr Armstrong QC submitted that the evidence amounted to a respectable body of scientific opinion which supported the therapy. Proceedings before the Family Division took on a very different complexion as Francis J sought to facilitate resolution between GOSH and Charlie's parents, respecting the understandable concerns and distress of Charlie's parents and that of his doctors continuing mechanical ventilation which they viewed as harmful to him. A multidisciplinary meeting was held between the GOCH clinicians and Professor Hirano, chaired by an independent clinical ethicist and, as agreed during court proceedings the previous week, attended by Connie Yates. It was the Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) body scan performed at this time which persuaded Charlie's parents that his condition had deteriorated to such an extent that the proposed therapy would not work. Two further hearings were held over arrangements for Charlie's end of life care, during which Francis J pressed for mediation encouraging the parties to find a mutually acceptable solution. The relationship between the hospital and Charlie's parents irreparably damaged, they were unable to agree upon his end of life care. Upon the order of the court, Charlie was moved to a hospice, ventilation was withdrawn and Charlie died, 1 week before his first birthday.
As Francis J noted, the applicable legal principles are 'well settled'. 89 Established legal processes and principles have developed through the common law since the early 1980s without any opportunity for reflection upon the extent to which they place the child at the centre or help to repair the relationship or support parents and professionals to work together in the best interests of the child and without the opportunity for any reflection upon that practice in what is now a very different medical and social context. Francis J concluded his April judgment expressing the view that in such cases an Issues Resolution Hearing or mediation to determine the common ground could lead to greater understanding between the parents and the clinicians which may, in some cases, lead to a resolution. 90 Rather than the case revealing that the legal process could be improved by the introduction of an additional stage, I argue that the case reveals the need for a thorough review of the applicable legal principles and processes for responding to and resolving disputes between clinicians and parents about the medical treatment of a child. The case raises a host of questions which require careful reflection and considered deliberation, including:
What, if any, legal duties do/should healthcare professionals have to provide information about a child's medical condition and treatment in the context of a developing disagreement with parents over treatment? What, if any, legal duties do/should healthcare professionals and/or Trusts have to respond to parental concerns about their child's medical treatment or to provide them with, or direct them to, reliable sources of support and advice? What are Trusts required to do to fulfil the obligation, as the ECtHR said in Glass, to 'take the initiative and to defuse the situation' 91 prior to making an application to court? responsibility to decide, strove to secure what they genuinely considered the evidence to demonstrate was best for Charlie. The protracted legal process was traumatic for Charlie's parents, stressful for Charlie's clinicians and nurses and, Lady Hale said, put the judiciary in the position of being 'complicit in directing a course of action which is contrary to Charlie's best interests'. 94 Decisions were made by the judge about Charlie's life-sustaining treatment, the experimental therapy and his end of life care but the legal process did not resolve the sincerely and strongly held differences of opinion between his parents and clinicians over what was best for him.
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